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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Scott Molen appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct
with a minor under the age of sixteen. Mr. Molen was convicted following a jury trial and
the district court imposed a unified sentence of twenty years, with eight years fixed.
Mr. Molen now appeals, and he asserts that: 1) the district court erred by failing to give
a unanimity instruction; 2 ) the district court erred by excluding evidence of the alleged
victim's sexual knowledge and behavior; 3) his right to due process was violated by the
use of his silence to have the jury infer guilt; and 4) the district court abused its
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discretion by failing to strike an allegation of criminal activity from the Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinaffer, PSI). This Reply Brief responds to the first two issues
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Molen's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUES
1. Did the district court denying Mr. Molen's statutory and constitutional rights to a
unanimous jury by failing to give a unanimity instruction?
2. Did the district court err by excluding evidence of S.Z.'s sexual knowledge?

ARGUMENT

The District Court Denied Mr. Molen His Constitutional And Statutorv Riahts To A
Unanimous Jurv Verdict When It Failed To Give The Jurv A Unanimity Instruction
A.

Introduction
The district court instructed the jury that Mr. Molen could be found guilty of lewd

conduct if jurors determined that he committed the crime in either 2004 or 2005 and the
jury heard evidence of several acts of alleged criminal conduct. Despite the jurors
hearing about separate incidents of criminal conduct upon which they could find guilt on
the criminal charge, the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously
agree on the specific incident constituting the offense. In failing to give the obligatory
unanimity instruction, the district court denied Mr. Molen's constitutional and statutory
rights to a unanimous verdict, thereby committing both reversible and fundamental
error
6.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Give The Jury A Unanimity lnstruction
The State asserts that, because the jury was not presented evidence of separate

acts of genital-to-genital contact, the district court did not err by failing to give a
unanimity instruction. (Respondent's Brief, p.4.) The State's argument overlooks the
definition of genital-to-genital contact, and a review of the record shows that the jury did
hear evidence of multiple acts.
The State seems to equate genital-to-genital contact with an act of sexual
intercourse, as the State asserts that the only act of genital-to-genital contact in this
case occurred when Mr. Molen allegedly penetrated S.Z.'s vagina with his penis.

(Respondent's Brief, p.5.) However, the jury was instructed that it was not necessary
that skin be touched; touching could occur through the clothing. (Jury Instruction 12.)
Genital-to-genital contact, therefore, need not be intercourse.
This Court need not look anywhere beyond S.Z.'s testimony to find evidence of
multiple acts. On cross-examination, S.Z. testified that "sex stuff happened three times
the first summer and "one or two times" the second summer. (Tr., p.331, L.21 - p.332,
L.5.) "Sex stuff," meaning, "touching on [her] privates," happened one or two times in
2005 and about three times in 2004. (Tr., p.332, Ls.6-16.) She stated that one time,
they "both had their underwear on" but he was "still doing that." (Tr., p.342, Ls.24-25.)
She specifically stated that on other occasions "privates touched without any clothes
on." (Tr., p.343, Ls.17-20.) S.Z. also specifically stated that she thought intercourse
happened four to five times; she had previously stated in the preliminary hearing that it
happened twelve times. (Tr., p.340, Ls.6-7.) She specifically testified that in 2004,
Mr. Molen "did it three times," and by "did it," she meant, "sex stuff." (Tr., p.318, L.22 p.319, L.2.) She testified that something "like sex" happened in Mr. Molen's camper
and tent, although with clothes on and no penetration occurring. (Tr., p.318, Ls.1-13.)
However, genital-to-genital contact can occur through the clothing and penetration is not
required.
Individual members of the jury could have found that genital-to-genital contact
happened when Mr. Molen and S.Z. were in the camper, when they were in the tent, or
that it happened three times in the first summer and one or two times in the second
summer rather than the event of intercourse described by S.Z. In fact, there is evidence
in the record that places reason to doubt that intercourse occurred. Mr. Molen's expert

witness , Dr. Friedlander, testified that that he found no evidence of blunt force trauma
and it would be "extremely hard to believe" that penetration had occurred. (Tr., p.695,
Ls.?-6.) In describing the report, Dr. Friedlander stated,
We have - we can put together the anatomy of this child's hymen from
looking at the photos. [...I
The books will show the ring of the hymen, the entry ring of the hymen.
There is almost always, without exception, a very - an opening in the
center of the hymen that's present from birth. Books will show this is
round. The truth is it's never round.
The examiner correctly described a mound at the 6 o'clock position. This
is present, and you can see it just by the shadows. You can see that it's a
bump.
Next to this bump, I see very clearly a second larger somewhat flatter
mound here, okay, but then continues up here. And the reason that I
believe what the colposcopist is describing as a notch at 8:30 is actually
the edge of the mound.
If I can think what to compare it to, it might - look at the edge of one of
these beautiful mesas that we have in Idaho, you see the angle, and we
call that a notch.
Now, over here, we have a lesion, what appears to be a - you can tell,
again, by the shadow. The shadow is present right in here. We have a
fold. It's like if I folded my necktie, this looks like a notch, really it's a fold
in the tissue. And you can see this even,as a shadow, perhaps a shadow
behind that, behind the mesa. So this creates the illusion that we have a
second notch.
Okay. Now, when the hymen is traumatized, I want you to think about
what might happen if the frenum under your lip or under your lower lip or
under your tongue was torn. It would heal from the bottom. So you're
likely to get - if this is the original tear, it will tend to heal in the depths
first, and you're likely to end up with what I'm illustrating in black, a much
smaller notch on the surface.
But I don't see these notches. This appears to be just the end of a
mound. And we have here a fold.

So, in my opinion [...I we've gone from a finding that's somewhat
worrisome for sexual abuse to a normal anatomy. Mounds are
normal. Folds, of course, are just folds.
And to avoid this kind of problem with folds is why a child should be
examined and should be photographed from several positions,
which I think was probably not done here.

(Tr., p.689, L.21 - p.692, L.3 (emphasis added.)) Based on his review of the report,
Dr. Friedlander testified that, "I find it hard to believe, extremely hard to believe," that
S.Z. had been penetrated. (Tr., p.694, L.24

- p.695, L.3.) Because the jury

heard

evidence of multiple acts and could have based its verdict, in part, on any one of them,
the district court erred by failing to give a unanimity instruction.
Also, Mr. Molen may indeed rely on S.Z.'s CARES testimony and video in this
case to show that he was being accused of multiple acts. The State asserts that they
are not substantive evidence. (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) First, the CARES evidence
was introduced by stipulation, not pursuant to a hearsay exception. (Tr., p.870, Ls.810.) Furthermore, no limiting instruction was given when the evidence was admitted.
(Tr., p.490, Ls.15-21; Tr., p.870, Ls.8-10.) Additionally, even to the extent that it was
admitted only for purposes of credibility, the jury could use the evidence to determine
how many instances of illegal conduct it believed occurred and could have based its
verdict on that basis.
Further, contrary to the State's position, Mr. Molen's reliance on the preliminary
hearing testimony is indeed proper. The State asserts that the hearing was never
placed into evidence and was only read during closing argument. (Respondent's Brief,
p.10.)

However, S.Z. was specifically cross-examined on her preliminary hearing

testimony and she acknowledged that she stated that sex occurred about twelve times.

(Tr., p.339, L.14 - p.340, L.7.) At trial she modified her answer to four or five times.
(Tr., p.340, Ls.6-7.) Mr. Molen's reliance on the preliminary hearing testimony is proper.
Finally, the State asserts that any error in failing to give the instruction was
harmless. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-13.) The State is incorrect. The State relies
primarily on the harmless error analysis in Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 268-69, 16
P.3d 937, 944-45 (Ct. App. 2000). Essentially, the State argues that because Mr. Molen
was convicted, the jury made a credibility determination in favor of S.Z. and therefore
any error is harmless.
First, taking this argument to its logical conclusion, anytime that a defendant is
convicted, the error would be harmless because the jury would have come to the
conclusion that the victim was credible. Second, Miller is very different from the instant
case. In Miller, the Court of Appeals noted, "C.B.'s testimony relating to the specific
instances of sexual misconduct was uncontradicted."

Id. at 268, 16 P.3d at 944.

Further, this uncontradicted testimony on any one of the specific instances of manualgenital contact would have satisfied Count I. Id. In this case, S.Z.'s testimony is
contradicted both by herself and Mr. Molen. At trial, S.Z. testified that intercourse
occurred only once; she had previously stated in the preliminary hearing that it
happened twelve times and stated at trial that it could have happened four or five times.
(Tr., p.340, Ls.6-7.) Mr. Molen testified that he never touched S.Z. inappropriately.
(Tr., p.635, L.24 - p.635, L.18.) S.Z.'s testimony is not uncontradicted. In this case it is
very possible that the jury did not believe all of S.Z.'s testimony but did not believe
Mr. Molen either, and thus individual jurors could have reached different conciusions as
to what conduct Mr. Molen was guilty of.

Further, the State's reliance on State v. Banks, 46 P.3d 546 (Kan. 2002) is
unavailing. Much of the Banks analysis was disapproved by State v. Voyles, 160 P.3d
794, 805 (Kan. 2007).

In Voyles, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that Kansas

appellate courts have held that the failure to give a unanimity instruction to be reversible
error except when the defendant presents a "unified defense, e.g., a general denial." Id.
The Voyles Court noted, however, that "we are not dealing with simply a unified defense

- in one of its purest forms, a mere credibility contest between the victims and the
alleged perpetrator." Id. This is because, "we have some discrepancies between the
girls themselves, some discrepancies between the girls and Miller, and some
inconsistencies in C.C.'s statements, i.e., what she told Theis on the videotape and
what she testified to at trial." Id. The Voyles Court noted that the Banks Court did not
believe that the difference in testimony of the victims concerning the number of times
there were touched at each location was determinative and therefore failure to give the
instruction was harmless. Id. But, "[tlhis general rationale from Banks is disapproved."
Id.

In this case there are discrepancies between what S.Z. testified to at trial, what
she testified to at the preliminary hearing, and what she told the CARES interviewer. In
such a case, it is very possible that the jury did not believe every allegation that S.Z.
made even though Mr. Molen issued a general denial. The jury could have disbelieved

Mr. Molen and parts of S.Z.'s testimony. The failure to give the unanimity instruction is
not harmless error.

The District Court Denied Mr. Molen's Sixth And Fourteenth Amendment Riahts To
Cross-Examination And His Fourteenth Amendment Riqht To Due Process Bv Not
Allowing Questionina Concernina The Alleaed Victim's Exposure To Sexual Acts
A.

Introduction
Mr. Molen asserts that the district court denied his right to cross-examination

protected by the Sixth Amendment and his right to due process protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by denying him the right to
present evidence that the victim's sexual knowledge did not come from the alleged
incident. Further, he asserts that his proferred evidence was relevant.

B.

The District Court Denied Mr. Molen's Sixth And Fourteenth Amendment Rights
To Cross-ExaminationAnd His Fourteenth Amendment Riaht To Due Process By
Not Allowina Questionin0 Concerninq The Alleqed Victim's Exposure To Sexual
Preliminarily, the State asserts that Mr. Molen may not bring his constitutional

claims because they were not raised in the district court. The State is mistaken. In
State V. Araiza, 124 ldaho 82, 856 P.2d 872 (1993), the ldaho Supreme Court stated:
Araiza contends that even if the trial court's ruling was proper under I.R.E.
608(b), the limitation on his opportunity to impeach Cunningham violated
his Sixth Amendment riaht to confront witnesses. Although Araiza did not
present this issue to the trial court, we address the issue. If the limitation
on Araiza's opportunity to impeach Cunningham through crossexamination were error, it would be fundamental error because it goes to
the foundation or basis of Araiza's rights. State v. Kenner, 121 ldaho 594,
597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992).

Id. at 91, 856 P.2d at 881. Further, Mr. Molen specifically asserted the following in his
Appellant's Brief:
The Supreme Court further held in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973), that:

The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is,
in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against
the State's accusations. The rights to confront and crossexamine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf
have long been recognized as essential to due process.

Id. at 294. In Sfate v. Perry, 139 ldaho 520, 81 P.3d 1230 (2003), the
Idaho Supreme Court recognized that a defendant's right to present
evidence is fundamental, but subject to reasonable limitations. Id. at 523,
81 P.3d at 1233 (citations omitted).
(Appellant's Brief, p.18.) This Court may, therefore, address this issue
However, even if the State is correct and only an argument concerning relevance
and prejudice are preserved, the district court still erred. The State wishes to focus only
the specific allegation that S.Z. had knowledge of oral sex, sex like "doggies do it," and
wanted a "tattoo on her pooty." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) However, Mr. Molen also
sought evidence that S.Z. was familiar with sex because she had observed her mother
having sex and her mother discussed sex with her. (R., Vol. 11 p.293.) Specifically,
counsel argued the following:
One of the most pressing questions the jury will ask itself is how this eight
year old girl would know so much about sex unless she had actually been
molested. The defense will produce several witnesses, including the
sisters and mother of the Tiffany Davidson, the alleged victim's mother,
who will testify that Tiffany Davidson has exposed her daughter, [S.Z.] to a
constant, graphic, sexually charged lifestyle for her entire life, including
openly having sex with multiple partners with [S.Z.] in the home, openly
discussing and showing sex toys and pornography in front of [S.Z.], and
openly disrobing in front of other family members in the presence of [S.Z.],
etc. This evidence is not only relevant under IRE Rule 401 and 402, it is
crucial to the jury's understanding of the accuser's knowledge of sexual
matters and how she obtained it. Without it, the jury will make
assumptions that are in no way based in reality.

(R., pp.289-90.) As set forth in the initial Appellant's Brief, S.Z.'s knowledge of sex was
very relevant as it could have provided an explanation of how she could have known

about sex apart from the instant allegations against Mr. Molen. Further, the probative
value is not outweighed by confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and unfair
prejudice. In fact, the opposite is true; the source of a child's sexual knowledge is
extremely relevant.

The defendant must have the opportunity to show possible

alternative explanations for the child's ability to describe sexual events. The district
court erred by refusing to permit Mr. Molen to admit this evidence into trial.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Molen requests that his conviction for lewd conduct be vacated and his case
remanded for further proceedings. Additionally, he requests that it be remanded for
correction of his PSI.
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